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Terry Copp 
Bill McAndrew, Donald E. Graves, and Michael Whitby, Normandy 
1944: The Canadian Summer (Montreal: Éditions Art Global 
Inc., 1994), 164 pages, $39.95. 
Bill McAndrew, Bill Rawling, Michael Whitby, Liberation: The 
Canadians in Europe ((Montreal: Éditions Art Global Inc., 
1995), 170 pages, $39.95. 
Bill McAndrew, Canadians and the Italian Campaign, 1943-1945 
(Montreal: Éditions Art Global Inc., 1994), 167 pages, $39.95. 
[All books distributed by Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON] 
When the Department of National Defence decided to publish a series of books to 
mark the anniversaries of Vimy, Dieppe and 
D-Day no expense was spared. Hardcover, 
9x12, full colour editions were designed by Art 
Global and published in both official languages. 
Anyone with experience in publishing knew 
that really big bucks were involved in producing 
these titles yet initially little attention was paid 
to promotion or distribution. Historians outside 
the National Defence establishment were of 
course envious - the budget for one of these 
books would have financed a dozen scholarly 
books - but government decisions have never 
been easy to understand. 
Vimy, the first title in the series and Dieppe, 
Dieppe were beautiful, expensive rehashes of 
a familiar material reflecting the point of view 
of the author, Ben Greenhous. When Normandy 
1944: The Canadian Summer, published in 
1994, appeared all eyes were focused on 
Normandy but the book had little impact 
presumably because the series was now viewed 
as an exercise in public relations for DND. 
Despite my own in tense in teres t in the 
Normandy campaign and my respect for the 
senior author, Bill McAndrew, I gave it little 
more than a glance when it came in for review 
and no one else expressed any interest in 
commenting on it. 
In 1996 Canadians and the Italian 
Campaign was pub l i shed . I read Bill 
McAndrew's account of the struggle in Italy 
with interest. No one knows more about this 
subject than McAndrew and an overview by a 
serious scholar was long overdue. The book is 
very well written and the illustrations, except 
for the maps recycled from the official history, 
are outstanding. The introduction offers a good 
discussion of Allied strategy and Canadian 
prepara t ion . McAndrew draws upon his 
knowledge of battlefield psychiatry, 1st Division 
personalities and the work of Canadian war 
artists and historians to enliven the text. The 
use of diaries and letters to convey a first-hand 
impression adds to the feeling that we are 
coming into direct contact with the soldiers' 
experience of war. 
McAndrew's account of the battle for Sicily 
is familiar in outline but exceptionally rich in 
new detail. His chapter on Ortona is simply 
the best account we have of that dramatic 
confrontation. We are first reminded of the 
paradox of offensive operations in Italy which 
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could only be justified as a means of holding 
German divisions away from France. As Sir 
David Hunt, Alexander's Chief Intelligence 
Officer put it "failure was the means by which 
the Allied Armies in Italy succeeded in fulfilling 
their strategic purpose." 
"Ortona" is followed by equally powerful 
chapters on "The Liri Valley" and "The Gothic 
Line." In both essays McAndrew's sympathetic 
approach to the Canadian experience provides 
new insight. Especially noteworthy is his 
explanation of the dismissal of Lieutenant-
General E.L.M. Burns. McAndrew notes, "His 
misfortune was ironic considering that the 
Gothic Line operation was one of the most 
notable if unheralded Canadian Corps actions 
of the war. " 
Having profited from reading one book I 
decided to revisit Normandy 1944 which 
McAndrew wrote with Donald Graves and 
Michael Whitby. The format, a well written 
narrative of events spiced with first person 
accounts is similar but the navy also gets its 
share of space. Michael Whitby, a brilliant 
young naval historian lost to the Directorate 
in the recent downsizing, cont r ibutes a 
marvellous chapter on "Canada's War at Sea" 
and adds new material on aspects of "Neptune." 
McAndrew's interest in the impact of war upon 
soldiers is evident throughout but especially 
in his chapter "Young Men in Combat." 
Normandy 1944 contains solid accounts of 
the July battles with moving human interest 
stories. It also offers a sophisticated critique 
of Canadian and British operational and 
tactical doctrine. No similar analysis of the way 
Germans fought the battle is offered so the 
reader is left with the picture of the Allies 
overcoming the clever and resilient enemy with 
"Brute Force." 
I enjoyed Normandy 1944 and learned from 
it. There is much in the book which is new 
though the interpretative framework is very 
traditional and the need to cover complex 
issues in a few paragraphs produces serious 
simplifications. The chapters on August 1944, 
while adding some neat detail to the store of 
published accounts ignores the strategic and 
operational context within which decisions 
were made reinforcing the image of a bumbling 
Canadian army. 
Consider the treatment of the 89th and 
85th infantry divisions which arrived in 
Normandy on 5 and 10 August respectively. 
Both were fresh, well equipped divisions with 
their own engineers, artillery and self-propelled 
assault guns backing six full strength infantry 
battalions. Just before "Totalize," 89th Division 
took over Verrières Ridge with one regiment 
occupying Tilly, Rocqancourt, Fontenay and 
May and the second in reserve south of the 
ridge. If the Canadians and 51st Highland 
Division destroyed an entire division on 8-9 
August and then smashed 85th Division a week 
la ter does i t say any th ing a b o u t thei r 
effectiveness in "Totalize" and "Tractable"? If 
the German infantry divisions were not totally 
destroyed does it help to explain where the 
battlegroups which blocked our advance to 
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Trim came from? Relying on the self-serving 
accounts of German officers to picture the other 
side of the hill is never a good idea. Normandy 
1944 should be read by specialists as well as 
beginners. It is a serious and challenging work. 
Liberation: The Canadians in Europe is less 
successful. The decision to cover the entire 
post-Normandy campaign in Northwest Europe 
in 100 pages of text presented a real challenge 
and since Michael Whitby was joined by Bill 
Rawling to share the writing with McAndrew 
there is both tactical air and naval history to 
be included. The at tempt to describe the 
strategic debate of September 1944 relies 
almost entirely on views expressed after the 
failure at Arnhem and leaves the reader with 
the impression that the authors know that 
alternate courses of action not followed would 
have been more successful. Someday someone 
will have to explain why sealing off the Beveland 
Isthmus in September, assuming it could have 
been done, would have led to an earlier opening 
of the port of Antwerp. If 15th Army was 
"trapped" would tha t not have made the 
cap tu re of Beveland, Walchern and the 
Breskens pocket more difficult? Of course, 15th 
Army would probably have continued north to 
Schouwen and Tholen if Woensdrecht was 
occupied but either way the approaches to 
Antwerp would still be under German control. 
The operational story, which is told with 
heavy reliance on first person accounts, is 
much more interesting and original but there 
are problems with the selection of "primary" 
sources. Charlie Forbes was a superb combat 
soldier but his memoirs, for all their colour, 
are not entirely free of dramatization and his 
account of the Walchern Causeway is a good 
example. Donald Pierce's Journal of a War 
provides insight into the mind of a one veteran 
writing a self-consciously literary memoir years 
after the events. Explorations of the construction 
of memory in the aftermath of the Second World 
War will make good use of such sources but they 
should not be confused with the events of 1944. 
McAndrew's i n t e re s t in batt lefield 
psychiatry is evident in his account of the 
af termath of the Scheldt bat t le and the 
discussion of the reinforcement problem which 
follows is worthy of a separate scholarly article. 
It is quite simply one of the most thoughtful, best 
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The authors also found room for long neglected 
ancillary units including field engineers and the 
Ordnance Corps. Their account of the RCAF role 
includes Flight Lieutenant Richard Audet's 
journal for 29 December 1945 when he became 
the only pilot in Second Tactical Air Force to shoot 
down five enemy planes in one day. 
Chapter IV "Seaward" is devoted to the navy 
and RCAF squadrons in Coastal Command. 
Whitby focuses his story on the 75 RCN vessels 
that served in European waters including 29th 
and 65th RCN Motor Torpedo Boat Flotillas 
which were actively involved in the battle to 
open the port of Antwerp. The account of the 
operations of HMCS Sioux described as a 
"capable ship that has never received the 
attention it deserves" will be of interest to 
everyone as will the description of the sinking 
of HMCS Guysborough. Let us hope Michael 
Whitby is able to continue to play his part in 
the writing of the RCN's official history. 
Chapter five "Rhineland" and six "Finale" 
are brief overviews which work well as 
interpretive essays but once again the balanced 
and reasoned critique of Canadian generalship 
and doct r ine is not para l le l led by any 
commentary on the actions of their opponents. 
If German senior commanders knew the 
realities of battle better than their Canadian 
counterparts it did not stop them from ordering 
near suicidal counter attacks. The authors might 
have used Corps and Army Intelligence reports 
which provide contemporary documents , 
translated from the German, portraying the 
growing demoralization of the German army 
under the impact of the Allied offensives. 
These three books, as well as the recently 
published volume on the battle of the Atlantic 
are distributed by Vanwell. Priced at $39.95 
they are not cheap but at a minimum you 
shou ld buy Canadians and the Italian 
Campaign and Normandy 1944, you won't 
regret it. 
Terry Copp is the Editor-in-Chief of 
Canadian Military History and the 
author of numerous books and articles 
on the Canadian army in the Second 
World War. 
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